A MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INCENTIVES IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS

Abstract

The  existence  and  performance  of  peer-to-peer  systems  depend  on  the
contribution of resources from interacting peers. One of the challenges of
resource sharing in peer-to-peer systems is free riding. A situation users
attempt  to  exploit the  system  by  utilizing  the  resources  of  others  without
contributing.  We  view  this  from  rationality  perspective  that  every  peer  in
the  network  will  attempt  to  maximize  their  utility  of  the  system.  In  this
paper,  we  approach  the  problem  of  free  riders  mitigation  from  utility
optimization  point  of  view,  by  modeling  each  peer's  interest  as  Utility
Maximization Problem (UTP). We propose analytical model for the whole
network as a mixed integer linear programming model. The super peers in
the network are given the responsibility of maximizing the utility of all peers
connected to them. This is to ensure fairness among the interacting peers
and the stability of the entire system. This technique allows peers to either
upload or download resources based on their best strategy and interest.